Market prices of corporate bond spreads and of credit default swap (CDS) rates do not match each other. In this paper, we argue that the liquidity premium, the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option and actual market segmentation explain the pricing differences. Using the European transaction data from Reuters and Bloomberg, we estimate the liquidity premium that is timevarying and firm-specific. We show that when time-dependent liquidity premiums are considered, corporate bond spreads and CDS rates behave in a much closer way than previous studies have shown. We find that high equity volatility drives pricing differences that can be explained by the CTD option.
Introduction
The valuation of credit default swaps (CDS) requires estimating the expected loss in the event that the reference entity defaults in the future. The main component of expected loss, the riskneutral default probability, can be estimated either from equity (as is the case indirectly in structural form models 1 ) or from debt markets (as is the case most often in reduced form models). In the latter case, the corporate bond spread is the main source of data for the estimation. However, corporate bond yields combine different types of risk for which investors demand compensation. The most discussed component is credit risk, which compensates investors for the risk of non-repayment. Another component is interest rate risk, which is stripped out in the spread but may nonetheless affect it via call features or prepayment options.
Corporate bond yields also contain a liquidity premium, which reflects the transaction cost of a particular bond. In this paper, we conduct an empirical examination of the pricing of the default premium by first decomposing the bond yield into different layers and then examining how the liquidity premium and the liquidity adjusted default premium behave 2 . This research thus addresses the question of whether the corporate debt market is integrated with the credit protection market and of how consistent the pricing of CDS is with the pricing of corporate bonds in Europe 3 .
Most past studies test the competing hypotheses of full integration, mild segmentation and complete segmentation for world capital markets 4 . This study differs from this line of work by examining two sub-markets in Europe: the corporate debt market and the credit protection market. In this paper, integration is defined as a case where credit risk on the same reference entity has been priced the same in the two markets. Segmentation refers to the case where investors price the same credit risk differently in the two markets. The most efficient way is to specify the imperfection that created segmentation. In this paper, we study the barriers that cause these imperfections: liquidity in the corporate bond market, actual segmentation and the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) in the CDS market. By stripping out liquidity premia, the pricing differences are only explained by the actual segmentation and the existence of the CTD option that distorted the CDS price for European names in the study period.
1 See Merton (1974) or Cossin and Pirotte (2000) for details. 2 The model we chose to decompose bond yields works on transaction data. The CDS rates used for this research are quotes not suitable to derive liquidity premia. Apart from the data limits, we chose to ignore the liquidity effects on CDS rates based on the facts that default swaps are unfunded contracts and the 5-years CDS rates are the most liquid swap written on the most liquid names. 3 As observed by Kwan (2001) , the separation of credit risk from liquidity risk is also important for the evaluation of current and future economic activity. 4 Errunza and Losq (1985) , Errunza, Losq, and Padmanabhan (1992) (2002) find an average absolute pricing error of 33 basis points using treasury yields and 11 basis points when using swap rates. We find a much lower pricing error of 11.7 basis points using treasury yields. After adjusting liquidity in bond yields, the absolute pricing error in cross section is 1.2 basis points.
Liquidity is a difficult concept to define, even more so to quantify. Recent empirical literature on the liquidity premium includes Janosi, Jarrow and Yildirim (2002) , Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003) , Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003), and Jarrow (2001) . In this paper, we implement the limited dependent variable model (hereafter the LDV model) -proposed by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and extended to fixed-income markets by Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) -to separate the liquidity premium from bond yields and to estimate a time-varying, firm-specific liquidity premium. In general, the LDV model derives the liquidity premium well.
The cross-sectional mean of the liquidity premium is 10.8 basis points, which is on the low side of the liquidity premium found in previous research 6 . Our estimate of the mean liquidity premium ranges from 2 basis points to 60 basis points. Liquidity is a major driver of the difference in prices between the corporate bond market and the credit protection market: When the liquidity premium is considered, spread differences fall and these differences are not significant anymore for 20 out of 39 firms. The empirical results on risk-free rate choice are mixed, though there is a clear consensus that liquidity should be a priced item in the bond prices 7 .
The bond data used in the LDV estimation is downloaded from Reuters, and consists of daily transaction prices on straight corporate bonds from January 1, 2002 to July 23, 2003 there are 24,940 daily observations of 119 bonds issued by 39 European companies. The 5-year CDS data is taken from Bloomberg. In total there are 8,374 daily observations issued on the same 39 reference entities. In the analysis, we first obtain zero-coupon yields from straight coupon bonds, transform the zero yields into par yields, then interpolate the par yields to capture 5-year bond par yields. Following Janosi, Jarrow and Yildirim (2002), we estimate the liquidity premium for each bond on each transaction day using a rolling procedure. We take the average of the liquidity premium for all bonds issued by the same firm as a proxy for the liquidity premium on a 5-year bond as if the firm has one issue each day. The default premium implied 6 Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003) find the liquidity premium ranges from 9 to 24 basis points; Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) estimate the mean liquidity premium is about 30 basis points. It is not surprising to have a lower liquidity premium in our research as the sample firms are the most liquid European names. In choosing these bonds for analysis, issued amount and other criteria further constrain the chosen bonds to be the most liquid ones. 7 See also Brown (2001) .
from debt prices is compared to the CDS premium quoted in the credit protection market before and after stripping out liquidity premium. The comparison is to determine how time-varying liquidity plays a role in the pricing of corporate bonds. We then regress the corporate bond yield spread against the CDS premium to check how much of the corporate bond yield spread can be explained by credit risk. As an explaining variable, the liquidity premium is also added in the regression to check if it adds explaining power.
One result that differs from previous research using US data is that the average difference between bond spreads and CDS rates 8 is not always positive. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2004) report that two factor may lead CDS prices being greater than the implied yield spread: the CTD option and the repo cost. They suggest that CDS is an upper bound on the price of credit risk and the implied yield spreads should form a lower bound. For 5 out of the 39 firms, the average difference before stripping out liquidity are significantly negative, meaning that, on average, the 5-year bond par yield spread is lower than the CDS premium quoted in the market for these 5 firms in the period of the study. After stripping out liquidity, the number of firms with the CDS premium higher than the implied bond par yield increases to 14. It is not conclusive that CDS prices should always be higher than the implied yield spread due to the liquidity component in bond yields. Our results suggest that in peaceful periods, both the repo cost and the CTD option value are not significantly high which reflects the fact that the pricing differences are small.
Only in the volatile period, especially when default probability increases, the combination of the increasing repo cost and the CTD option value may be greater than the liquidity component in bond yields, and may lead to CDS prices being greater than the implied yield spreads.
The regression results show that liquidity is an important component in the bond yield spread.
T-statistics of the liquidity variable are significant for 35 out of the 39 sample firms. For each firm, the root mean squared error decreases and the adjusted R² increases by adding liquidity on top of the credit component. However, the influence of liquidity and credit varies for different rating groups (as well as for different companies, of course). As the credit quality of the firm declines, credit risk becomes the principal explanatory power, while liquidity, though significant, decreases in explanatory power. For higher rated firms, the major portion of the yield spread, ranging from 60% to 80%, can be explained by the combination of credit and liquidity. For a lower rated firm, credit risk alone may explain over 95% of the yield spread. These results on credit risk are in line with previous research, such as Huang and Huang (2002) , in which credit risk accounts for a small portion of the yield spreads on high-rated firms, but a large portion of 8 That is, bond spread minus CDS price.
yield spreads on low-rated firms. Our results show that though liquidity adds explaining power, an important portion of spreads in high-rated bonds, ranging from 20% to 40%, still remains unexplained. By plotting the interpolated bond par yield and CDS quotes, we observe that the divergence period correlates with financial distress or periods of high market uncertainty. We explored the factors driving the pricing differences and found that the pricing discrepancies are highly correlated and explained by equity volatility 9 . The regression results support both the role of the CTD option in European CDS prices and the market imperfection argument. When participants in the two markets react differently to the same credit fundamentals, the pricing discrepancies provide arbitrage opportunities to sophisticated investors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the model that explains the relationship between the bond yield spread, the CDS premium and the liquidity premium;
Section 3 describes the data for the analysis and the estimation procedure; Section 4 examines the major results; and Section 5 concludes.
Liquidity Premium, Bond Yield Spread and CDS Rate
In this section, we first discuss various approaches to estimating the liquidity premium and validate our choice of the LDV model. Then, we extend Hull, Predescu and White (2003) to include liquidity in the non-arbitrage relationship. Further, a simple regression model is proposed to test the explaining power of the different components of the corporate bond yield spread.
The Liquidity Model
How to measure liquidity? This research question has frequently been addressed in the finance literature. The first strand of literature focuses on the "direct" measures such as bid-ask (1983) as the LDV model. Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) employ the LDV model in the estimation of common equity liquidity and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) extend the model to study liquidity in corporate bonds.
9 Which is consistent with Weinstein (1985) . 10 For example, Hong and Warga (2000) study the effective bid-ask spread using exchange-based bond transaction data. However more than 90% of bond trades are carried out in the OTC market.
The LDV model assumes that an informed investor will only trade when profits exceed transaction costs. 11 A security with low transaction costs will have more frequent price changes than a security with high transaction costs. The logic is that high transaction costs result in fewer price movements, therefore more zero returns than low transaction costs. The significance of the liquidity effect can be evaluated by observing the incidence of zero returns on a security. Both
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) find that liquidity measures from the LDV model relate to direct liquidity measures such as the bid-ask spread in both the equity and debt markets. LDV liquidity estimates are indistinguishable from the underlying bid-ask spreads and compare well with the trading cost established in previous research. The two successful implementations of the LDV model in both the equity and debt markets distinguish the LDV model in the liquidity estimation. In this research, we follow Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) in the estimation of the bond liquidity premium on each transaction day. Though other models may also be viable approaches, we choose the LDV model on the basis of solid theory and data availability.
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2003) model the bond returns as a function of the changes in interest rates and changes in the S&P500 index. They choose the two factors based on the consensus that high grade bonds are sensitive to changes in both interest rates and general stock prices, while low grade bonds are less sensitive to changes in interest rates but more sensitive to stock market changes. Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) scale both coefficients by the daily duration of the bonds. We find that scaling changes by daily duration has no significant impact on the estimation, and the return process is thus modified to the following equation:
where R* j,t is the daily unobserved "true" bond return for bond j at time t, j1 and j2 are the coefficients of bond j at time t, R t is the daily change of the 10-year risk-free interest rate, StockIndex t is the daily return on the stock index. 12 The relationship between the observed bond return, the unobserved "true" bond return and the liquidity cost can be stated as R j,t = R* j,ti j,t , i = 1 or 2, with 1 j,t as the effective buy side cost, and 2 j,t as the effective sell side cost for bond j.
2 is the variance estimate using only the nonzero measured returns. The LDV model imposes the liquidity constraint on the objective function: 11 The negative relationship between asset illiquidity costs and trading frequency is the theoretical foundation of many papers, for example Amihud (2002) . 12 We use 11 stock indices to represent the European countries involved in the analysis and the subscript has been omitted for simplification. 
The sum is over the sets 0, 1, 2 of observations for which if we assume that the default risk is the only difference between a corporate bond and a similar Treasury bond. If we denote the bond yield as y, the yield on a similar risk-free bond as r, and the CDS spread as s, the relationship y -r = s should hold approximately. If the bond yield spread y -r is higher than the CDS spread s, debt market participants assume a higher credit risk than participants in the credit protection market, and buying depressed corporate bonds using proceeds from shorting Treasury is profitable. The position can be covered by buying the CDS to attain risk-free arbitrage profits. Otherwise, the arbitrage by buying Treasury, shorting bond and CDS, is profitable. Pricing discrepancies would give rise to arbitrage opportunities. One issue that complicates the arbitrage is the fact that in practice the real payoff of CDS is different from the idealized 13 . To correct for the difference, Hull and White (2000) and Hull, Predescu and White (2003) refine the relationship as:
13 This arbitrage works exactly if the CDS allows the buyer to sell a par yield bond for its face value plus accrued interest. 
where R is the expected recovery rate, A is the expected accrued interest on the reference bond at the time of default, and A* is the expected accrued interest on the par yield bond at the time of default. In the event of a default, the bond delivered is usually the one with the lowest accrued interest, therefore A might be assumed to be zero. Further, A* can be assumed to be equal to y/4 in Hull, Predescu and White (2003) . This assumption is based on the fact that most of the corporate bonds in their analysis pay coupons twice a year. The expected accrued interest at the time of default is 25% of the par yield. The arbitrage relationship is then simplified to:
This relationship holds approximately under some assumptions: a flat Treasury yield curve, constant interest rates, and the independence of interest rates, default probabilities and recovery rates. More significantly, when default happens, the expected accrued interest on the reference bond is assumed to be zero, and the expected accrued interest on the par yield bond is assumed to be 25% of the par yield. Hull and White (2000) show that the arbitrage is reasonably accurate when interest rates are not high and yield curves are flat. This is exactly the case for our study period.
Building on this largely simplified model, we introduce liquidity risk as this component is widely recognized. For example, in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) , only 25% of the observed credit spread changes can be explained by the numerous credit risk proxies. They assume that liquidity might be the single common factor that drives the residuals. As liquidity is an indispensable component in the bond yield, if it is ignored, the default premium derived from the corporate bond yield is an upward biased measure of the actual risk of default. This notion is based on the assumption that liquidity is a positive component in the bond yields.
14 At first sight, the credit market is not liquid as many CDS quotes do not change over time. Though there might a possibility that CDS may be even less liquid than bonds 15 , we follow Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) and assume that the CDS is contractual in nature and that the CDS spreads reflect the default risk component. The CDS price also includes a CTD option and repo costs, which entails that the market CDS price is an upward estimate of default risk. However, the size and scope of this option is hard to estimate and we do not have reliable data on repo cost. We therefore assume that the corporate bond yield, the risk-free rate, bond liquidity and the CDS spreads are related through the following equation : 14 See Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2003) , Hong and Warga (2000) and Schultz (2001) . 15 the LDV model does not work well with quotes and we do not have transaction data on CDS transaction prices. The other reason that we choose not to model CDS liquidity is that CDS contracts are standardized and unfunded instruments, generally considered more liquid than most corporate bonds.
where s* t is the 5-year CDS spread quoted in the credit protection market at time t, y* t is the interpolated 5-year bond par yield at time t, r* t is the 5-year risk-free Euro interest rate at time t, n is the number of bonds used in the estimation, * j,t is the round-trip liquidity premium for a par bond j at time t.
In this paper, s* t has a 5-year maturity, which is the most common one in the CDS market, though it is up to the contractual parties to decide the maturities of the CDS. However, we do not see corporate bonds with a fixed maturity of 5 years everyday. The corporate bond par yield y* t used in the analysis has to be estimated with a set of bonds with maturities that bracket the maturity of the CDS. The estimation of the 5-year bond par yield y* t follows three steps:
Stripping out coupons to obtain zero-coupon bond yields, transforming the zero-coupon bonds yield into bond par yields, and interpolating the bond par yield curve to obtain the 5-year bond par yields. The risk-free Euro curve could be either the Treasury curve or the swap curve. Hull, Predescu and White (2003) argue that the swap curve can bridge the difference between the debt and credit markets, citing that the yields on US Treasury bonds tend to be lower compared with the yields on other low risk bonds. In this paper, we use the Euro Treasury curve for two reasons:
First, the debt market regards the corporate yield spread as the spread of the corporate bond yield over the yield of a government bond; second, there is no consensus whether the factors leading to a depressed US Treasury curve would have the same effect on the Euro Treasury curve. For each firm, the number of bonds used in the estimation varies, ranging from 2 to 7, with an average of 3. We allow the liquidity premium to be a time-varying variable to reflect the changing transaction cost of a particular bond. The average liquidity premium for all bonds issued by the same firm is a proxy for the transaction cost of the interpolated 5-year bond. The expected accrued interest on the par yield bond at the time of default is approximated by y* t /2, as most of the European bonds in the analysis pay coupons once a year. Though, in reality, the accrued interest could be any portion of y* t , we take the yearly average of 50% for simplification. By stripping out the liquidity component in the bond yield spread, we expect that the credit component implied from the bond market should be more closely related to the CDS spread quoted in the credit market.
We then consider to what extent the corporate bond spread as determined by the bond markets correlates to the CDS rate determined by the credit protection market. The first regression we estimate is:
where y* t is the interpolated 5-year bond par yield at time t, r* t is the 5-year risk-free Euro rate at time t, and s* t is the 5-year CDS spread quoted in the credit protection market at time t.
Further, for robustness, we investigate whether adding the liquidity component increases the explaining power. We thus estimate the following regression:
For ease of interpretation, we group firms by ratings. Summary statistics of the distribution of coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3 . The S&P ratings (AA, A, BBB, BB, B) are chosen to replicate the credit quality of each borrower in the period of the study. We expect that by adding the liquidity component, the second regression should increase the overall explaining power. We also expect that the two components play specific roles in different rating groups.
The pricing of credit risk in the two markets is not expected to be perfect all time. A meaningful research result is to know the true driver of the pricing differences. For example, if the CTD option is priced in CDS prices, then the driver of the CTD option value -the riskiness of a company -should be able to explain the pricing difference. We consider the regression: 
Data and Estimation
In this section, we discuss the data used. We also detail the implementation procedure and some preliminary statistical results.
• Credit Default Swaps
We download the daily 5-year CDS last prices for 180 liquid European reference entities from From these two samples, we identify 39 reference names 16 that have issued a sufficient number of Euro-denominated bonds.
The daily CDS quotes were scanned for data errors. We do observe abnormality in the data set, though overall the data was reliable. On February 26, 2003, the CDS price for Ahold was 1,000 basis points, and the next day the price dropped to 35 basis points. Further, on May 19, 2003, the CDS price rose from 17 basis points two days earlier to 550 basis points. In such cases, the CDS prices for the abnormal period were deleted. The study period saw the most dramatic turbulence in the European credit protection market. Many reference entities experienced credit decline, especially autos and telecoms. In our finding results, the majority of quotes lay between 10 and 700 basis points, with the two big movers Ahold and KPN reaching 1,000 basis points.
The average of the CDS quotes for all reference entities is 107 basis points. The summary statistics of the CDS are given in Table 1 . Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the CDS premium, which varies across ratings.
• Corporate Bonds
The bond data are crucial in the estimation of the default premium as well as of the liquidity premium. It is essential to use bond transaction prices rather than quotes to estimate liquidity premium.
For comparison as well as to test the strength of the bond transaction data, we also used the daily clean price from Datastream to estimate bond liquidity. Although not shown in the paper, we find that the non-transaction data set does not provide significant bond premium estimates.
• Risk-Free Rate, Stock Market Indices and Implied Put Volatility
Euro government curves are provided by Pictet. The government bonds used in the bootstrapping procedure are those included in the JPMorgan EMU government bond index. The bonds are straight bonds with fixed coupon rates. Following a standard bootstrapping and interpolation procedure, on each transaction day we observe both 5-year and 10-year risk-free Euro rates. The 5-year government curve is used as a proxy for the risk-free rate, and changes in the 10-year curve are used in the LDV model and maximum likelihood estimation. We record MSCI country indices for the 11 European stock markets from Datastream. Like the 10-year risk-free curve, changes in stock market indices are used for maximum likelihood estimation.
Implied put volatility data are taken from Bloomberg for 29 firms. The volatility data are used in the analysis of the pricing differences between debt and credit markets. The period of risk-free rates, stock indices and implied put volatility corresponds to the period of the CDS sample.
• Estimation of Corporate Bond Par Yield
For each transaction day, we first obtain zero-coupon bond yields from straight coupon bonds issued by the same firm using a bootstrapping procedure. We then transform the zero yields obtained into bond par yields. By regressing against maturity along the bond par yield curve, we obtain a 5-year bond par yield y* t interpolated from traded debt prices.
• Estimation of Liquidity Premium
To estimate the liquidity premium for each bond on each transaction day, we follow Janosi, Jarrow and Yildirim (2002) 
Results
We compare the default premium implied from debt prices to the CDS premium quoted in the credit protection market before and after stripping out the liquidity premium. Since the CDS prices are not carried over non-trading days, we clean the bond par yields interpolated, liquidity and the 5-year risk-free rate to make the three time series correspond to the CDS in calendar dates. Using equation (6), we strip out risk-free and liquidity components from the interpolated bond par yield y* t , rescale it to remove the influence of accrued interest, and obtain a 5-year liquidity adjusted default premium from the debt market. The non-liquidity adjusted default premium series is therefore compared with the CDS quotes in the credit protection market, and the differences are given in the analysis. We regress corporate bond yield spread against the CDS premium to see how much of the corporate-Treasury spread could be explained by credit risk. We add liquidity as an explaining variable to see if by doing so the overall explaining power improved. We also explore the changes of the CTD option value in driving the pricing differences in a volatile market. The results are detailed in this section.
The Relationship between CDS Rates and the Liquidity Premium
19 Corresponding to the total transaction days in the past 6 months if we consider there are 252 transaction days for the year.
An interesting correlation between the market CDS premium and the liquidity premium can be viewed in Table 3 . For AA firms, the CDS price is negatively correlated with the liquidity premium; a decreasing CDS price or increasing credit quality couples with increasing liquidity premium. We find the same negative relationship exists for the 15 A-rated firms, though the correlation coefficient increases from -0.2322 to -0.1864. The correlation between credit and liquidity reverses starting with BBB-rated firms. For these 18 firms, the average correlation is 0.2106, meaning that decreasing credit quality leads to a higher liquidity premium. The effect is more pronounced when credit quality declines further, with BB-rated firms having a correlation of 0.7169 and B-rated firms one of 0.9082. This phenomenon agrees with the theoretical predictions that transaction costs are higher at the two ends 20 . High-rated bonds tend to fall into the hands of institutional investors who hold the position until maturity. When credit quality declines to the speculative level, sellers cannot liquidate their positions, simply because they cannot find buyers of distressed bonds in the market. Both ends lead to high transaction cost which is supported by the liquidity premium derived from the LDV model.
How Are Debt Markets and Credit Markets Related When Stripping out Liquidity?
The differences between the non-liquidity adjusted default premium from debt prices and the market CDS premium Table 4 . The statistics include the industry, ratings, mean of the difference, associated t-statistics, the minimum and maximum values of the difference, and the correlation of the two series. The hypothesis testing for the difference in means of the two samples is also given in the table. If the result is 1, we can reject the null hypothesis of zero mean at the 0.01 significance level.
Unlike Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) using US data, we find that the average difference is not all positive for the 39 firms. The non-liquidity adjusted default premium from debt prices is not always greater than the market CDS premium. In theory, there is always a positive liquidity component in the corporate bond yield, which leads to higher yield, lower price, and higher default premium from debt prices than otherwise. However, our study of European data shows this is not the case for all firms, which leads to the role of the CTD option imbedded in the contract to be discussed in Section 4.4.
The average differences between debt and credit markets range from -48 basis points to 51 basis points. The mean of the average differences is 11.7 basis points. These results show that on average the CDS price is less than the non-liquidity default premium implied from bond prices; the differences vary significantly across all firms. The same conclusion can be reached from the maximum and minimum differences -on average, the minimum value is -55.1 and the maximum value is 54.1. The European result shows smaller differences compared with Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) , in which the cross-sectional mean of the average differences is 60.8 basis points. We also test the differences in means of the two series. At 0.01 significance level, we can reject the null hypothesis of zero mean for 28 out of the 39 firms. The nonliquidity adjusted default premium and the summary statistics are presented in Table 5 . 21 The mean of the average differences is 1.2 basis points. In the test of the differences in means, the null hypothesis that the mean is zero can be rejected for 19 out of the 39 firms. The average of tstatistics decreases from 7.7 to 3.3 and the majority of the firms 22 have t-statistics smaller than ten in absolute value. Interestingly enough, without using a different risk-free curve, we show that the average differences can be reduced by adjusting the liquidity component. By removing the first barrier of market imperfection, we find that the two markets are not that segmented as previously assumed. Note that the cross-sectional variation in differences across firms cannot be eliminated completely by adjusting liquidity. The variation is likely to be firm-specific due to the CTD option imbedded in the CDS prices. In Figure 1 , we observe clearly from the Akzo Nobel graph, that the non-liquidity adjusted default premium is higher than the CDS premium, but after adjusting liquidity, the difference between the liquidity adjusted default premium and the CDS premium is almost indistinguishable from September 30, 2002 to March 30, 2003, on a daily basis.
How Much of the Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread Can Be Explained by Credit

Risk and Liquidity Risk?
To test the significance of the credit component in bond spreads, we regress the yield spreads on CDS rates. In Table 6 , we present the regression results following the equation . As shown, the CDS premium is significantly positively related to the yield spread, meaning that as the CDS premium increases, the bond yield spread increases as 21 A summary of the pricing differences by ratings is given in Table 6 . 22 30 of the 39 firms in the sample.
well. We also group the estimated coefficients by ratings in Table 8 . From Table 8 , b increases from 0.5244 for AA-rated firms to 1.2139 for B-rated firms, and the associated t-statistics also increase from 16.2 to 76. The trend along the ratings is almost linear for both the coefficients and the t-statistics. As credit quality declines, the credit component increases its significance which can also be observed through the increases in R². The R² for AA-rated firms is 0.5131, increasing to 0.9666 for B-rated firm. This means that the credit component alone explains almost 100% of the yield spread for low-rated firms.
To test the liquidity component as a priced item in the bond yields, we regress the bond yield spread on the CDS premium and liquidity premium with this equation Table 7 . Of all 39 firms, only 4 show that the liquidity component is not significant, which confirms the notion that our estimate of liquidity is a priced item in corporate bond yields. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) report the regression of the pricing differences on the liquidity proxies. Among the bid-ask spread, the volatility of yield spread changes and the number of bonds, the volatility of yield spread is highly significant. Based on the similar measure of liquidity on price changes, our estimate of liquidity is highly statistically significant for 35 out of 39 firms in explaining the yield spreads. In terms of adjusted R², adding the liquidity component always adds explaining power, though the improvement varies. In Table 8 , we show that for investment grade bonds, liquidity adds more explaining power. For AA-rated firms, the adjusted R² increases from 0.51 to 0.57; for A-rated firms, the adjusted R² increases from 0.65 to 0.72; for BBB-rated firms, the adjusted R² increases from 0.78 to 0.80.
Various previous research 23 use indirect credit variables in the regression and their results
show that credit risk accounts for a small portion of corporate bond yield spread. Using the direct credit variable of CDS prices 24 in the regression, we confirm that credit risk might account for a larger portion of yield spread for low-rated firms. For high-rated firms, we find that the explained portion by credit risk is higher than 50%. The unexplained portion for AArated firms is 49%, for A-rated firms it is 35%, and for BBB firms 23%. Though CollinDufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) predict that liquidity has the potential to be the common factor driving the unexplained portion, it is not evident in our analysis. The fact is that liquidity does improve the explaining power, but, the unexplained portion of 20% to 40% still remains.
This leads us to the second barrier of imperfection: the actual segmentation of the credit and the debt markets and the existence of the CTD option in the CDS prices. When great credit uncertainty casts a shadow over the future of a company, investors in different markets tend to trade on incomplete information. In the case of France Telecom, the fear of default drives up both the CDS price and the CTD option value, and debt prices -though more volatile -follow suit, but not all bond prices decline to the same level.
What Drives CDS Prices Higher than the Bond Premium?
In practice, the market price of a bond immediately after default is usually lower than the amount to be recovered. Because of the lack of a fair market price, CDS traders favor a physical settlement in which one puts the reference bond or a pari passu bond to the seller and gets par.
The choice of available bonds for physical delivery after default gives the protection buyer a CTD option. The option should be priced in the CDS price. Thus, when some of the qualified bonds are much cheaper than the rest, the CTD option becomes more valuable, which drives up the CDS prices. Another factor that drives up the CDS price is the repo cost. In a perfect market, selling protection and shorting the bond form an arbitrage position. Without the convenience of owning the bond, the arbitrage has to be carried out by borrowing the bond which incurs the repo cost. The repo cost is then transferred in the protection price quoted. In that sense, the sum of the credit component, the CTD option and the repo cost in the CDS prices might exceed the sum of the liquidity premium and the credit component implied from the traded bonds. A closer examination of the 5 firms with CDS prices higher than the interpolated bond par yield shows that 3 firms were downgraded in this period, and the other firms were on the verge of being downgraded. In Figure 2 , the daily series graph of France Telecom shows that the two series closely resemble each other before and after the credit turmoil. Only in the period of severe distress and speculation, the CTD option is deeply in the money. However, when the scope of deliverable assets is restricted by the contract, the CTD option value is greatly reduced.
European CDS contracts are less restricted, and we observe 5 firms whose CDS prices are higher than the corresponding bond par yield spread. On the other hand, the US CDS prevents the delivery of very long-dated bonds, which might partially explain why none of the CDS prices are higher in previous research using US data.
The CTD argument is not easy to prove because of the difficulty in estimating the size of the individual option value. The Option Adjusted Spread (OAS) methodology, which uses optionpricing techniques to value the embedded option of a bond's total spread, does not fit the CTD option scenario. The CTD option value estimation would require the prices of deliverable bonds upon default. An option value of choosing the cheapest might only be discovered given a default event occurs. The CTD option estimation goes beyond this research. Apart from the estimation issue, ISDA introduced a modification of the modified restructuring clause in 2003, which limits the remaining maturity of deliverable assets to 60 months for restructured obligations and 30 months for all other obligations 25 . Thus, the new terms effectively limit the possibility of delivering long-dated bonds and consequently the CTD option in the European CDS market. In view of the new market practice, an estimation of the CTD option value does not contribute much to our understanding of the CDS market under the new restructuring. Inspired by the plotting of the market CDS quotes and the par bond yield series, we tend to believe that the pricing differences are closely linked to the uncertainty in the firm's financial performance, which is naturally linked to the CTD value. If there is huge uncertainty in the firm's creditworthiness, the expected recovery rate tends to be very low for certain bonds qualifiable for delivery, thus the CTD option becomes valuable given the pricing divergences across bonds.
When a direct test is not possible due to the lack of the necessary data to derive the CTD value,
we opt for an indirect test of the CTD option impact on the pricing differences.
In this section, we test if market uncertainty as approximated by the implied equity volatility is significant in explaining the pricing differences with the equation . * t is the implied put volatility series corresponding to the interpolated bond par yields and CDS quotes. The results are presented in Table 9 . Of the 29 firms for which we have implied put volatility data, 27 show a negative relationship, meaning that the higher the volatility, the higher the CDS quote over the interpolated bond par yield. Of the 27 negative coefficient firms, 20 show that volatility is significant in explaining the credit risk pricing differences in the two markets, with t-statistics average of -10.449. R² varies across the firms, with the lowest near zero and the highest over 60%. The relationship between market uncertainty and the pricing difference is plotted in Figure   3 , using France Telecom as an example. Throughout the whole observation period, the equation is negatively correlated to the market uncertainty.
In the previous section, we found that the unexplained portion of the pricing differences remains after considering the liquidity premium in bond prices and credit risk. To explore the factor driving the pricing differences, we consider the existence of the CTD option embedded in the CDS quotes and its impact on the pricing differences. Using the implied volatility as a proxy for the CTD option value, we found that the CTD option is a significant factor driving the pricing differences. As implied volatility increases, the CDS price becomes higher than the interpolated bond par yield. The relationship also confirms the role of the CTD option in the 25 Packer and Zhou (2005) CDS prices. However, since we cannot strip out the CTD option value, the actual size of segmentation for the two markets cannot be verified. Given the near linear relationship between the credit, debt and equity markets, the question will be: Can money be made on this three-way relationship?
Is Arbitrage Possible?
The credit protection market differs from the corporate debt market in many ways. First, the CDS is contractual, which allows hedge funds to enter margin trading and leverage up. The same group of investors do not necessarily trade bonds in the cash market. Second, the protection buyer can choose from a set of bonds or loans to deliver in the case of a physical settlement, while the exact CTD option value is unknown 26 . Third, the bond investors with a large investment tend to buy and hold, which makes the market less liquid. Fourth, in he event of default, the CDS pays par minus a recovery rate, while a bond may pay the market price less the recovery rate. With all these differences, are there arbitrage opportunities to be exploited? The answer lies in the transaction costs. Fourth, the arbitrage period cannot be predetermined. It may take months or years for the CDS prices and bond yields to converge. With changes in the market, bond lenders may opt out. If the borrowers fail to borrow and replace, so-called short squeezes may incur additional costs plus 26 The "cheapest to deliver" options are no longer that valuable since the latest round of iterations on ISDA documentation have increasingly limited the universe of bonds deliverable into a specific CDS contract. 27 As explained in Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002) . 28 J.P. Morgan (2002) reports that a France Telecom bond had a high basis but it was not supplied for repo on August 16, 2002. the collapse of the arbitrage positions. Furthermore, as observed in the credit market, the CDS bid-ask spread gets larger in credit turmoil. All in all, transaction costs and uncertainties make arbitrage more difficult. As observed in J.P. Morgan (2002): "In practice, however, it is seldom possible to borrow and short the bond due to liquidity constraints and the particular positive basis 29 is thus not realizable." The paper profit may not be realized and the arbitrage deal could be transformed into an uncovered risky one-side position.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have tested the dynamic relationship between the liquidity premium, the corporate bond spread and the CDS rate using transaction data on 39 European firms. Using transaction data increases the estimation accuracy. With various tests, we have also proved that the LDV model is a valid model in determining the liquidity premium. The formula developed by Hull, Predescu and White (2003), which approximates the relationship between corporate bond yield spread and the market CDS premium by adjusting the accrued interest, is also well grounded. Further, results in this paper probe many untouched areas or unsettled issues in credit research.
First, the daily correlation of the CDS and liquidity follows a linear trend along credit ratings.
Transaction costs are significantly higher very high rated firms and very low rated firms.
Institutional investors tend to hold high-grade bonds to maturity, and low-grade bonds are less liquid due to thin trading in the market. With the LDV model, we were able to estimate the daily liquidity premium for each bond which can be compared with the daily CDS premium. Our data crunch shows that for AA firms, the CDS premium is negatively correlated with liquidity risk with a coefficient of -0.2322, and the same negative relationship continues for A-rated firms.
The correlation between CDS and liquidity reverses starts with BBB-rated firms. The effect is more pronounced when credit quality declines further, with BB-rated firms having a correlation of 0.7169 and B-rated firms are of 0.9082. The fine linear relationship can be applied to the trading of individual bonds.
Second, after adjusting the accrued interest, the difference between the non-liquidity adjusted default premium and the CDS premium is very small. Using US data, both Hull, Predescu and
White (2003) and Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) report that the average difference is around 60 basis points. Our results show that in the EMU market, the difference is about 11 basis points.
Our difference estimate is lower because of the negative differences that appeared in the sample compared with the other research, which finds only positive differences. We also find that the CDS prices can be 300 basis points higher than the interpolated bond par yields when the firm 29 Here the basis is defined as the CDS minus the asset swap spread on a comparable cash instrument.
under study is in severe financial distress. Investigation of individual firms demonstrates that before and after the credit turmoil, the differences are small; only during the distressed period is the CDS premium much higher than the non-liquidity default premium. When the market is plagued with incomplete information, participants in the different markets tend to act irrationally by misreading the same fundamentals.
Third, after stripping out the liquidity layer from the bond yield spread, we find that on average the differences between the liquidity adjusted default premium and the CDS premium are only 1.2 basis points. Previous research proposes using the swap curve instead of the Treasury curve as the risk-free rate in the estimation of the default premium. Our research shows that we can achieve the same effect by stripping out liquidity. Using the swap rate in our analysis would only make the differences even bigger in absolute terms. However, the crosssectional variation in differences cannot be eliminated completely by adjusting liquidity. The variation is likely to be firm-specific, induced by the changes in the CTD option value or the segmentation of the credit protection and debt markets.
Fourth, by regressing the bond yield spread on the liquidity premium and the CDS premium, we confirm previous research that credit risk accounts for almost 100% of the bond yield spread for low-rated firms. For high-rated firms, credit risk alone explains more than 50% of the spread.
Our analysis shows that, though adding liquidity does improve explaining power, about 20% to 40% of the investment grade bond yield spread cannot be explained by the combination of liquidity and credit risk. A natural explanation for this gap is the segmentation of the EMU credit and debt markets and the CTD option unrelated to either credit or liquidity component.
Fifth, the pricing differences are highly correlated with the CTD option as approximated by the implied put volatility. By regressing the pricing difference between the debt and credit markets on the implied put volatility, we confirm that the pricing differences are particularly driven by the riskiness of a company. The sign of the volatility coefficients also confirms the role of a CTD option in CDS prices. The higher the market uncertainty, the greater the CDS price over interpolated bond par yield.
Sixth, given the near linear relationship between the credit, debt and equity markets, arbitrage is possible only if transaction costs are seriously considered. Market volatility not only increases the correlation between the three markets but also adds transaction costs as witnessed by the increased bid-ask spread, high repo rate and low transaction volume. The possibility of "squeeze" and basis risk may drive the spread toward an irrational level for a prolonged period and incur losses not predicted by theoretical models. The market CDS premiums are lower than the default premiums implied from bond prices in the whole period. After deducting the time-varying liquidity premium from the bond yield spread, the liquidity-adjusted default premium is almost indistinguishable from the market CDS premium for the first six months. 
